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OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

By the Author of the CONSIDERATIONS
on the same Subject.

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ON THE SAME SUBJECTS

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The SECOND EDITION.



LONDON:

Printed for JOHN WILKIE, at the Bible, in
St. Paul's Church-Yard. M,DCC,LXI.

OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS


ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN V.A.R.



By the Author of CONSIDERATIONS
on the same Subject.

THE SECOND EDITION.



LONDON:

Printed for John Warr, at the Bible, in
St. Paul's Church-Yard, MDCCLXI.

THE Author had intended last year to have published a second part of the Considerations on the present German war. But after having been disappointed in the hope of remaining concealed, he laid aside all thoughts of meddling any farther with the subject. He now hopes, however, that at a time, when we see every day so much repeated on one side of this question, he may, without being judged presumptuous, be allowed to state his thoughts on the other. They, who by their station understand the subject better, have too little leisure to write, and either too great an interest, or too little courage to speak. The reader will excuse the Author for having thrown together his materials in detached parts, as the few days which have past since he resolved on publishing, would not admit of his digesting them into a continued discourse.

He takes this opportunity to declare, that he has not been concerned in any part of the disputes about the merit or demerit of the
late

late Minister, nor in any other of the writings (though many of them would have done him honour) which have appeared in the public papers; except only one; which having been badly copied, is here reprinted. His subject is the German War: and therein he desires to confine himself to the argument.

He takes this opportunity to declare, that he has not been concerned in any part of the disputes about the merits or demerits of the late



A
P O S T S C R I P T,
TO THE
CONSIDERATIONS on the present
G E R M A N W A R.

Writ immediately after the First Day of the last
Session, and intended for the Second Edition.

A S the lessening of the chief nurseries of our
enemy's seamen, and dividing with them
their foreign sugar trade, seems to the Author the
great object of the present war, he hopes that he
may be allowed to obviate any objections which
may happen to arise.

Should it therefore be said, *that a nation may
overconquer itself : and by being fed with more con-
quests than it can digest, may have the overplus turn
to surfeit and disease instead of nourishment.* To this
it may be answered :

A small state, such as was that of Venice, for
instance, by extending its frontiers among a num-
ber of adverse powers, may lay itself under a ne-
cessity

B

cessity of keeping up a greater standing army than it can either support, or retain in due subjection ; and in that manner may over-conquer itself. But had the Venetians attended more to their marine, and confined their conquests to their islands, without pushing into the continent of Italy and Dalmatia, they had given less umbrage to the other states of Europe, and had more easily maintained their own.

Whether the whole continent of North America be too large a conquest for Britain to grasp at, may possibly be a question. But whether Martinico, whose exports are of ten times greater value to our enemies than those of Canada, and which may be kept by England for a tenth part of the expence, be too great a conquest for it, never surely can be a question. At a time, therefore, when we are felicitating ourselves upon the reduction of a whole continent, and when the most favoured addressees had digested so vast a meal, nothing which may have been said about sickness and disease, can conclude against our conquering an island for fear of a surfeit.

Our present islands lie each of them exposed to much larger ones of our enemies, and are therefore necessarily calling upon us for a fleet, to serve as a portable garrison for their protection. By annexing Guadalupe and Martinico to them, we shall secure our present little islands under the shelter of these

these large ones ; and by extending our possessions, shall really lessen our frontiers. Instead of having the French and Spaniards both to guard against, we shall thereby in a manner get rid of the French, by whom alone we can ever be endangered, and have only the Spaniards to guard against, who know that they have much more to lose themselves by war, than they can hope to gain from us.

Can these islands set up for independence ? Are they less accessible to our fleets, or less amenable to our jurisdiction, than the midland forests of America ? Will they require *that infinity of stores*, which we have heard complained of, *as taking up so great a part of our fleet to supply them* ? Will their kinds of produce interfere with those of England, or with those of our present vast northern Colonies ? These therefore, are not the conquests which will turn to disease. On the contrary, sugar, rum, cotton, indigo, coffee, and cinnamon, make of all other commodities the most proper food for the commerce of Britain, which it can the most easily digest, and turn into the richest nourishment.

If it be really matter of doubt, whether we have not already over-conquered ourselves ; what then are the twelve millions for ? Are they all to be consumed in Germany, where only there is no possibility of our making any conquest at all ?

*I shall be very thankful, it has been said, to proceed to a treaty with all those conquests in our hands, which we now have. Can our enemies then take them out of our hands during the war? Might we not, when we proceed to a treaty, find ourselves upon better terms with our rivals, if Martinico also were in our hands, rather than theirs? Are they not the more likely to leave us one, for our having both in our possession, and holding the rod over their part of St. Domingo, as they have done over us in Germany? Would not our own people be better satisfied with the giving up of one, for our retaining of the other? In the present increase of our northern colonies, can we well do without one of them? Are these to depend on French islands for the consumption of their produce? Are we to people the vast continent of America for the French to have the benefit of supplying it? or only to enlarge the market for the planters of our present Islands? to render them so much the less capable of rivalling the French in any foreign markets, and make them more entirely masters of our own? To be braved with property in more than fourteen counties, and double that influence in our councils, which is already so predominant? **

There
** The reader will apply this reasoning to the importance of our fixing our property in, and settling of, what are falsely call'd the Neutral Islands: if indeed, after all our conquests,*

There has another danger been mentioned, that of giving umbrage to other nations, by pushing our conquests too far. But whatever may have been

conquests, we must give up Guadalupe to our German dependencies.— Our present islands never have produced much more sugars than are necessary for our own British consumption. Unless therefore in our future treaty, the two great objects of the war be attended to; and some check given to the growth of the French fishery in Newfoundland (which, from the time of its first discovery to this day, has been acknowledged in every treaty to be ours; and which Lord Oxford was impeach'd † for allowing to the French the use of the north part of) and some increase made to the English growth of Sugar, and shipping in the West Indies; we may very possibly in a few years see the French marine rising up to an equality with our own: and may then find too much employment for our ships at home, to be able to spare any for the protection of distant little defenceless islands. Or should we after that see a French garrison in Cape Breton, or any other fortified Island, and a French fleet interrupting our Newfoundland fishery, under pretence of protecting their own; and a French army ready to march into Westphalia, the nation may then at length be too well convinced, that after boasting of our conquests all the world over, we have given up the most valuable part of them; and have spent sixty millions of our treasure, to enlarge the market for, and enhance the price of Jamaica sugars.

† See the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the 13th article of Lord Oxford's impeachment.

said on this head, cannot refer to the West-Indies. When we have already been disgusting all the northern powers by a land war in Germany, we cannot surely have any real apprehension of danger in our keeping down the French marine in the West-Indies, for fear of giving umbrage to the Spaniards; when that Spanish power never can be formidable to Britain, but in conjunction with the French.*

After all, we readily admit the justness of temperate maxims, and acknowledge that there is a moderation which every State ought to observe. But is this moderation in our councils to be confined only to our acquisitions, and not at all to regard our out-goings? Must it not therefore seem a little hard to a common understanding, and ought it not to sting the breast of every good man, to observe that at that very time, when by advancing to twelve millions instead of eight, we declare that we have hitherto not done enough for Germany; we should chuse, at that very time, to express our apprehensions, that we may have already done too much for Britain, or that we cannot hereafter do too little for ourselves.

* So very different was the language of last year from the present.

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TH E R E is a remarkable observation, which arises from considering the particular time, when this argument was made use of.

We were not to conquer Martinico; an Island, which would yield us the largest returns, and could liberally pay us for the expence of keeping it; for fear of *over-conquering* ourselves, and yet we now know, that at that very time, and for several months after, the public was amused with an expedition against another Island; which having only a bad road, and no harbour, could answer no one good purpose, and tended only to divide our force, and multiply our expence; and which was therefore a conquest of that very kind, which has the most direct tendency to hurt us. For a moment let us suppose, that we had gone on in the same course; and conquered first Oleron, and then the Isle of Rhé. Fifteen thousand men would have been wanted to garrison these. The national defence would have been thereby so much weakened; and these men would have been kept upon the enemies coast, to spend their pay upon French produce, and would have required a fleet of victuallers, as those of Bellisle now do, to preserve them from starving, and a squadron of men of war to prevent the French from landing and carrying them off.

I have one more observation to make on this head. In the last Sessions, as well as in this, the German war was represented as a war of diversion. But we know now by the event, what was then the object of our councils. He therefore who shall then have said that the German war was to divert the French force, and thereby favour the English operations elsewhere, must then have said nothing better, than that he resolved to spend seven millions of the national treasure in Germany, to prevent the French from sending succours to Canada, which we had already conquered, or to Martinico, which we did not intend to attack; or else that all this expence was incurred merely to favour the Conquest of Bellisle. A conquest, which, we see by the Negotiations, our enemies laugh at us for having made, and will scarce take again, when we offer it them.

Was then the German war intended to divert the French force from invading us? This, I think, is now the argument in fashion; and therefore, though I have already obviated every thing, which has since been offered on this head, yet it may deserve to be re-considered.

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THE
ARGUMENT for the GERMAN WAR,

As a DIVERSION, Re-considered.

NONE but such as are unacquainted with the maritime force of England, can believe that, without a diversion on the continent to employ part of the enemy's force, she is not in a condition to hope for success, and maintain her superiority at sea. — They must be very ignorant indeed, who imagine that the forces of England are not able to resist those of France, unless the latter be hindered from turning all her efforts to the sea.

The King of England's Conduct as Elector of Hanover: in answer to the parallel of the conduct of France with that of the King of England, Elector of Hanover, in the year 1758.

C

I Have

I Have often thought with myself, what could be the motives which induced the late Minister to embark the nation so deeply in a German war. The opinion of its being a religious one has been long exploded. After enquiring of my friends what were the reasons, which he himself, when he was in power, used to give for this measure, I never could hear of more than these two. The one, that he found us in Germany, and did not carry us thither; the other, that the German war is a diversion of the French Forces; and enables us to exert our own in distant operations without fear of an invasion. Upon these two reasons taken together, one naturally asks, if this second reason be a good one for going into Germany, what need is there for apologizing for it by the first, and saying that he found us there: wisdom is justified of itself, and looks not to accident for its support. But the assigning of two opposite motives for the same action, is apt to create a doubt whether either of them be the true one. What may be the case here, the reader will enable himself to judge by a few plain observations.

In the first place then, whoever supposes the German war to be a wise and eligible measure, as a diversion of the French from invading us, must suppose, that there really exists a probability of danger. I don't insist that the probability of such invasion should be great, but some probability there must be; greater or less; because mere physical possibilities are no motives of action.

In the next place I observe, that if the German war be really chosen as a war of diversion to keep the French from invading us (or from succouring their colonies, or invading ours, for this argument will equally hold good in all these three cases) then that diversion will be more or less necessary, in proportion as the danger is greater or less; and a Minister will certainly press most for the war of diversion at those times, when the danger of invasion is greatest; and be less concerned about such a diversion, at those times, when there is less danger of invasion.

The danger to England of being invaded by France is greater or less, according to the number of their troops and of their ships. As to troops, France, in time of peace, has never less than two hundred thousand men in its pay, and must therefore always have soldiers enough for an invasion of England, which ordinarily does not keep up twenty thousand. The real danger therefore to England must

be in proportion to the numbers of troops which the French have actually upon their coasts, and the number of their transports to carry them, and of ships of war to protect them : or, in other words, in proportion to the strength of their navy. These are such plain axioms, that the reader, I suppose, will rather condemn the mentioning them, than be inclined to dispute them. Now then let us see how the past events will quadrate with the opinion that this has been the motive for the German war.

In the beginning of the English war the "*French were preparing a great fleet at Brest and Rochfort, restoring Dunkirk, marching down an hundred and twenty battalions to their coasts, and all the roads to Flanders, Normandy, and Britany, were covered with carriages laden with cannon and arms, and all the apparatus for some great enterprize then in hand;*" which, says the Memorial for the requisition of the Dutch troops, *can be no other than a descent upon Great Britain.* I don't enter into the question, whether the real intention of the French was to invade us, or only to fright us, perhaps to invade, if their fleet should be ready before ours, or else to go to Minorca and Louisburg : but whatever were their intention, all that my argument requires is, that there was an appearance at least of danger.

Every

Every one now, who is in the least acquainted with our parliamentary debates, must know, that during all this time, while the French fleet was the most formidable, and when our fleet and army were not yet arrived at much more than half of their present strength; every one, I say, knows, that during the year 1755 and 1756, this Gentleman and his friends were continually inveighing against a continental war, and all our German operations. They spoke, they wrote, they were turned out, and received their gold boxes upon that account. It was then represented as a betraying the interest of their country to fight for Hanover; or to hire Hessian and Russian soldiers for that purpose.

Thus things continued till the end of the year 1757, by which time the enemy's naval force was greatly broken; we had many of their ships in our ports, and more than half their seamen in our prisons. Our army was strengthened by the raising a great number of new battalions, and our ships and seamen all in full vigour. Then it was that this gentleman's mind became suddenly illumin'd: and as the dangers of an invasion grew less, he now perceived the necessity of a diversion in Germany to grow greater; and having disgraced a General of our own Royal Family, for having been too good an Englishman, and put an end to the first German war by the treaty of Closter Seven, which

which he then called an infamous padlock put upon the Hanoverian swords, he entered upon a new German war of double the extent, and quadruple the expence.

Far be it from me to judge of other men's professions; but it is impossible not to lament the imbecility of the human mind, when we see a great patriot, who had long stood firm on an English basis, all at once fall off to a German interest, and then bewilder himself with an imagination, that though in the beginning of the war, when the French navy was in its greatest strength, and our's weakest, we did not want any such diversion for our security; yet now that the French navy was reduced, and the English every where triumphant, we ought to run into a German war, as a necessary precaution to divert the French armies from invading us.

Once indeed, since that time, our enemies had got together a fleet, and having that, they found no difficulty in bringing down twenty thousand men to their coasts. The German war was not such a diversion to their arms, but that in three months time after our boasted victory at Minden, when this diversion was in its greatest force, the French formed the design of invading us. And having once provided ships, they had men enough to embark on board them to answer any purpose either

of

of succouring Canada, or invading Ireland, still facing us in Germany with an army superior to ours. By the sea-fight off Belleisle, their navy has been entirely broken, so as to render it irrecoverable during the present war. Without ships, without seamen, and without trade, how is it possible for them to raise a marine, which can be in the least degree formidable to ours? From that time therefore the German war, far from being a diversion of the French force from invading us, has been nothing but a diversion of the English treasure to exhaust us: Yet ever since the battle of Minden, the whole force of our efforts has been employed in Germany. With forty millions spent, scarce a single new expedition of any valuable consequence to Britain was attempted in two years after that time. Martinico, and even St. Lucia, remained untouched. Instead of sending our forces abroad to such inviting conquests, we have been trifling near home in an island, without harbour, and without produce; which we now see neither our enemies by the loss of it, nor we by the possession of it, have yet found the use of. Only one regiment has been sent to the East Indies; and notwithstanding the superior advantages we have for sending ships and men thither, all our successes in those parts have been obtained with an inferior force. While six millions have been spent on the German war, twenty thousand pounds only has been

been voted for the East Indian. The falling state of our funds, and of our treaty, both shew what this German diversion tends to. Shall we find the produce of Hesse and Hanau equal to that of Guadaloupe? Or will the opening the navigation of the Rhine and the Maine prove as great a nursery for French seamen as the trade of Newfoundland? Already had we, in our treaty, given up for Germany all the advantages we had gained in the fishery and the sugar trade: and should this same war of diversion go on much longer, we shall find, that instead of fighting in Germany for America, we shall have really lost America in Germany. Whatever may have been the case before, yet now that the French marine is totally sunk, should any one now affirm, that a German war is necessary for us as a diversion; when then is it to become less necessary? or when are we to be without one? But should any gentleman, who in the beginning, when the French navy was in full vigour, was the most earnest pleader against a German war, be now the most positive for it; such an one may, if he pleases, value himself upon his former firmness, in not fearing danger, where it possibly was; but it will be hard to prove the merit of having put us to an expence of twenty millions, to prevent it, where it certainly was not. Admit that the French invasion in the beginning of the war was but a spectre, yet even spectres may be allowed to fright by their first sudden appearance. But with ill grace shall

shall he boast his fortitude, who in the very act of triumphing over others for their sudden fears, can own, that this spectre, long since laid to every other eye, has for four years together still appeared to his : That use and time cannot recover him from its terrors, but the longer he beholds it he fears it so much the more ; and after having already parted with four, five, and six millions, is now sweating out the last eight millions under the dread of it.



THE following list of French ships, taken or destroyed in the course of this war, was published a few weeks ago in the papers. I don't answer for its exactness : but if it be near to the truth, it shews how very powerful our enemy's navy will grow in a few years interval of peace, and how little we have to fear from it, during the rest of the war.

D

A LIST

A LIST of

*Ships taken from the French from the beginning of
the war to the 1st of October, 1761.*

Ships.		Numb. of Guns.	
4	—	84	} Line of battle 47
14	—	74	
2	—	66	
17	—	64	
1	—	58	
2	—	56	
1	—	54	
6	—	50	
4	—	44	} Frigates 84
2	—	40	
19	—	36	
1	—	34	
13	—	32	
3	—	28	
2	—	26	
7	—	24	
3	—	22	
7	—	20	
1	—	18	
7	—	16	
4	—	14	
2	—	12	
1	—	10	
8	—	8	

ADDE

A D D I T I O N S

FOR THE

SIXTH EDITION of the

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT GERMAN WAR:

**Which the AUTHOR thinks a Full Reply to all
which has been objected by his numerous An-
swerers:**

A D D E N D A

TO THE

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

GERMAN WAR,

(Printed in May last.)

PAGE 14. line 15. This independency of the several German States established by the treaty of Westphalia, is what the German Princes call the liberties, and constitution of Germany*.

* The guarding against any events, which may shake the constitution, or overturn the system of the Empire; or in other words, the preservation of their own independence, may be a very interesting concern to the several German Princes in their own German Diet at Ratisbon: but was never made an object of a British parliament's regard, till the end of the year 1756: when by a fatal mistake of a French interest for an English one, it was proposed as a motive for the present German War. The unnatural union of councils abroad, the calamities, which in consequence of this unhappy conjunction, may, by the irruptions of foreign armies into the empire, shake its constitution, overturn its system, and threaten oppression to the protestant interest there, are,

are events, which must sensibly affect the minds of the nation, and have fixed the eyes of Europe on this new and dangerous crisis. Till that time, when we first openly avowed the cause of the petty German Princes, the interest of England, and the peace of Europe had always led us to wish rather to see some one great power established in Germany, which should be the natural rival of, and balance against the power of France.

Page 31. Is there any sort of oeconomy in our having in three years time put ourselves to an expence of twelve millions, to prevent France from getting six hundred thousand pounds out of Germany? *

* One of my foreign answerers (whose work, *Le Faux Patriote Anglois*, I hoped to have seen done out of French for the benefit of the English reader) accuses me of reasoning as a merchant, and makes here the following remarks: "I leave you, Sir, to judge if this is the right way of calculating in affairs of general politics: whether some pounds sterling more or less ought to regulate the determinations of cabinets." Page 50.——And again:

"If the electorate were now in the same state of imbecility, in which it was, when its sovereigns were called to the crown of England; its falling under the dominion of a new potentate, would perhaps be in itself a matter of indifference: But Hanover is now no longer an inconsiderable power: it has great influence on the affairs of Germany. Since its electors have become kings of England, the riches, which they have made to pass into that country, have given it a much greater
" degree

“ degree of force than it had before ; and the state by be-
 “ ing wealthier is become more powerful. The resist-
 “ ance it has made to France in this war, is a convin-
 “ cing proof of this.” Page 68.

This answerer, I suppose, does not know that the elec-
 toral troops are paid and fed by the English parliament.

He goes on, page 71. “ The English nation has often
 “ complained of this disposition of things, which obliges
 “ it against its will to maintain great armies in Germany,
 “ to support the rights of a dominion not belonging to it :
 “ but they forget that this evil is in a manner incorpo-
 “ rated with the state. For that monarchy, it would no
 “ doubt be a desirable thing to have no possessions out of
 “ its own continent, to the end that its power, by being
 “ concentrated within its own island, might be able to act
 “ with the greater force ; but a certain arrangement of
 “ second causes has disposed things otherwise.——It is
 “ not my business to examine, whether the English, when
 “ they expelled king James, had not better have sub-
 “ mitted either to a state of slavery or a civil war, rather
 “ than to have chosen a king, who having political in-
 “ terests in Germany, distinct from those of their nation,
 “ must necessarily draw them into wars, which were not
 “ their own : it is enough for me to say, that the nation
 “ determined to take a sovereign of the present reigning
 “ family. If the misfortune was inevitable in its cause,
 “ it could not but be so in its effect.”

Again, page 73. “ It is with states as with private per-
 “ sons : they are never without some inquietude. In po-
 “ litics, as well as morals, the seat of evil is never void.
 “ If England had not this gnawing worm, she might have
 “ some

" some other : every government, we may say, has its ori-
 " ginal sin. According to the present state of Europe,
 " the original sin of Portugal is in Spain, of Venice in
 " Turkey, of Genoa in Corsica, of Denmark in Sweden,
 " of the House of Austria at all times in that of Bourbon,
 " of the empire in the Germanic body, of France in the
 " marine of England, and of England in the inconveni-
 " encies which arise from the possession of Hanover."

Thus far the answerer.

We have all of us, I suppose, lamented, that our Ger-
 man friends have so long been making their *profit* of us ;
 but it would have been more prudent surely for them to
 have concealed their intending now to plead prescription,
 and make us their *property*.

Page 74. Is it possible not to see the inequality
 in the number of men at least, which there is be-
 tween us and our enemies ? *

* The kingdom of France, in time of peace, has not
 less than two hundred thousand men in its land service :
 Britain has never yet kept up thirty thousand in its land
 and sea-service both put together. Let it, with the Irish
 establishment, be forty thousand. The ordinary land force
 of France therefore, with the addition of Saxon, Wirtem-
 berg, and other corps, *natives of Germany, and inured to*
the food and climate of that country, as much as the Hessians
 and Hanoverians, has furnished every year of the war
 hitherto an army superior to ours. Britain maintains in
 this war above two hundred thousand of its natives in its
 pay. In which country then has the war taken off the most
 hands from its agriculture and manufactures ? Or which
 country can best afford to send its subjects to cut each
 others

others throats, or rot in the hospitals of Germany? Admitting that France has there fifty thousand of its natives, out of its ordinary land force of two hundred thousand; England has four and twenty thousand, whose ordinary land force, Irish included, has been under thirty thousand, Can we the better afford to expose four and twenty thousand of our natives in a German war, for our having a hundred and eighty thousand necessarily employed in our own? Is the French extraordinary draft from the loom and the plow equal to ours? Should we wish to see here in England, Italian, Swiss, German, Walloon, and Irish brigades, to supply the place of our countrymen, employed, either about our own service in America, or in a foreign interest elsewhere?

Page 76. The ordinary revenue of the French, if they have seven millions, will enable them on the present plan of the war, to bring more men into the field, without borrowing at all, than we can by getting every year eight millions in debt *.

* I have hitherto given what appeared to me, to be much the most favourable turn to this argument. But if my answerers choose it, let us now state it in their own manner. The revenue of France, we have again been told this year, is but nine millions: two of these are to arise out of funds, which are already over-burdened; and possibly therefore may produce but one. Suppose then the whole to be eight millions. Let the half of these be taken up in the maintenance of their civil government, their fleet, their inland forces, and their numerous fortifications and garrisons, through that vast extent of their frontier to Spain, Italy, Germany, and Flanders, and through their north and west coast from Ostend to Bayonne. Be-
side

side this, notwithstanding all our successes in the East-Indies, France has met us there, with a superior force, in every engagement hitherto both at sea and land; what then must remain out of these eight millions for the payment of Swedish, Russian, and German subsidies, and the maintenance of the war in Germany? We may make this sum as little as we please; yet the fact we know has been, that the French have every year brought into the field there a number of men greatly superior to ours. My answerers have assumed two suppositions, which directly contradict each other; the one is, that France *has* much less than we, the other is that it *spends* a great deal more. They are welcome to one of them, and to make their choice of either; but the old axiom, *Nemo dat quod non habet*, will not admit of their taking both.

Page 86. What then was the foundation of those vain boasts, which were given out in the beginning of every session, that the French are ruined, and the next German campaign must be their last? *

“ *France is sinking; she knows herself sinking; this is the last effort of a dying power; 'tis the convulsion of death, the effort of despair: let us but resist it firmly, let us act with the vigour of success, and we need not fear any thing she can do from despair.* ”

“ *The war in Germany has given us elbow-room: the victory of Minden has made way for the conquest of America: the operations in Germany ~~has~~ given us the elbow-room of a year.* ”

have

Such was the confidence of our presumption, and such were the flowers of oratory, which shot up early the next spring after the battle of Minden. Yet with all that elbow-room, our British war during the next year totally languished: not a single squadron in eighteen months after failed for any new British conquest; nor was a single brigade sent out on any other than a German service. Far from gaining elbow-room, our arms have been pinion'd down to the defence of Hanover: while the French were cramping our trade in the course of that year more than in any preceding one, by their privateers in our own seas; and the Martinicans were braving us to conquer them, and by taking two hundred of our ships with the privateers of that island, were daily reminding us of the importance of making it ours.

Page 99. Considering it merely as a treaty for the hire of troops, it was much cheaper than any we have made since. *

* We have already mentioned the pay of the year 1759: but the several articles of our German expence have been so carefully concealed, that there is no judging of the account of a campaign, till the end of the following sessions. By the resolutions of the 27th of November and 20th of December, it appears that we paid to the Landgrave 426,725 l. for 19,012 men. The Hanoverians for nearly the same sum (447,882 l.) furnished us with more than double that number (38,750 men). The price of 55,000 Russians (exclusive of any allowance for the galleys and greater proportion of horse) would at the same rate amount to 1,230,000 l. so much more temperate in their demands are Hanoverians than

than Hessians, and Russians than either of them. These last were to have maintained themselves, not only in their own country, but when they marched out of it: but our German friends expect that we should feed them at their own homes; and, by an article, lucrative enough for mercenaries, but unknown among allies, have learned to double their demands upon us for forage and extraordinaries. Should the reader still wonder at the disproportion of these sums, he will recollect that very singular one of sixty thousand pounds, which in the affluence of our millions, was given, *to be paid as his most serene Highness shall think it most convenient, in order to facilitate the means, by which the most serene Landgrave may again fix his residence in his own dominions; and give fresh courage to his faithful subjects by his presence, which is so much wished for.* Whatever may have been our compassion the former year, for an old gentleman returning from Hamburgh to his own house; men must have winked extremely hard on these fine words, to renew the grant a second time in the very same form, when the old Landgrave's residence was already fixed at his own house, or rather he was dying at Rintelen; and when his son, being a new converted papist, might not have his presence so much wish'd for by his more faithful protestant subjects.

This first charge of sixty thousand pounds was submitted, upon account of the merit of having got rid of a word, said to be of dangerous import in the former treaty, *Dedimagement*: when by the convention of the 1st of April, the nation was much more effectually bound to take upon itself *a reasonable succour in money* of four times the sum.

The whole Hessian account therefore for the year 1760 stands thus :

	l.	s.	d.
For 19,012 Hessians - - - -	366,725	1	6
For a 2d facilitating the means of the serene Landgrave's fixing his residence at his own house nine months after he had not been out of it, - - - - -	60,000	0	0
For two augmentations of his troops, amounting to 3392 men -	121,872	8	7
For the Hessian share of forage and extraordinaries, being one fourth of 2,167,903 l. 12 s. 6 d. -	541,975	18	1
For releasing the Landgrave's enemies from a Dedommagement, and taking upon ourselves the obligation to grant him a reasonable succour in money - - -	220,000	0	0
	1,310,573	8	2

Upon comparing therefore the rates of the two treaties, it appears that Britain pays as much money for 22,404 Hessians, as would have purchased 142,000 Russians. So inattentive has our ease of borrowing made us to the value of our money.

The number of Hessian troops which we are to pay for is stated in the *Votes* to be 22,404; but no one, it is hoped,

hoped, will think the author weak enough to imagine, that that number really existed any *where else*. The noble lord, who was *officially* charged with the defence of them, when the house was to grant the 220,000 pounds, had too great a regard for his honour, to say, that there was any such number in the field; or that he had received any regular return of them. Even the return, which had been made up and sent him that morning by the Hessian minister for the occasion, could not raise their number to more than 16,000 men, and 466 musicians; and the general opinion of the house seemed to set it much lower. It was indeed said, that they were not much more deficient than the English troops. But we have an army here at home, on purpose to serve as a nursery for the German consumption, from which drafts can be made all the summer without observation. Whereas the defect of these Hessian troops is irremediable; because our enemies, being in possession of the country, choose to take all the young fellows of it into their own army, rather than send them to ours. One of my answerers has said, *that France subsidizes more powers than we do, and in all probable conjecture at a much higher price*. It would have been some consolation to us, if instead of groundless conjecture, he had produced an instance of the French subsidizing to the half of this height. We know the rate of Russian subsidies. Do the Wirtemberg rise to a fourth of our Hessian? Will the French suffer that duke to take their money, while we take his men?

Should the reader object to this last article of 220,000 l. being charged to the account of the year 1760, he will consider that the expence incurred by the French contributions was in that year. We shall have a new bill of charges made out for their inroads next summer, if indeed the next parliament will submit to pay it.

II

If the poor sufferers are to have this money, 'twere to be wish'd at least, that it may not be distributed among them, till the end of the war. The giving it them now, will be only rendering them so much the more tempting a bait for the French to come and eat them up again, and enabling the Landgrave to prove against us so much the greater damages. It would be enriching the enemy at the English cost, and inflaming our future reckoning with the loss of our own money. Far be it however from me to imagine, that the serene Landgrave, with his known humanity and tenderness, will not distribute it among the poor sufferers; and farther still that it was intended here that he should put it all into his own pocket. That would carry in it too much of the idea of a set of protestants bargaining with a popish sovereign for the ruin of his protestant subjects.

THE foregoing notes were all written during the last Sessions, but the author had intended to have done with this subject. It is now with extreme regret, that he finds it necessary to appeal to the public to judge, whether every thing which was advanced in these Considerations the last year, has not been verified by the experience of this. We have actually spent twenty millions: are our enemies brought at all the nearer towards giving us a peace? The greatest part of these have been employed in Germany, and in services relative thereto. Montreal was taken last year, and Pondicherry the very beginning of this: not a Shilling therefore of these twenty millions has been used in either of these services. Yet tho' so much of the strength of government has been exerted in Germany, the French force there during the whole of this summer, as well as in all the foregoing ones, has been greatly superior to ours. The dissensions among their commanders, and the single valour of the British troops, have now a second time prevented their defeating us, as before at Minden. This has been pompously represented to the public as a great victory? But what did Britain gain by this victory? Was it worth to us even the value of the candles, which we burnt in the illuminations for it? Did the French court fall in their demands after the battle of Fellinghausen? or did we?

Some

Some of his answerers have charged the author with arrogance, for presuming to differ from the public wisdom. One good man, after acquainting us, that his life is chiefly spent in his chambers at Edinburgh, sends us up from thence the sense of the nation; and wonders that any private man should contradict, what has been the result of such frequent debates in the British parliament. Such men perhaps will be surprized to hear, that the late parliament, tho' it granted away seventy eight millions of the public treasure, yet from the time of sending the first troops thither never had the question in debate, whether the war in Germany, and the sending over the British forces, was a right measure or a wrong one. All the great men in the kingdom, had either at the end of the last war, or in the beginning of this, declared it was a wrong thing: not one great man in the last parliament offered at an argument to prove it a right one.

There is a mode and fashion in thinking, which is apt to hurry men out of the possession of their better judgment. But seven years ago the very thought of sending our troops into Germany would not have been born. Is there any intelligent man living, who, if at that time he had been asked, whether it would be right for Britain singly to engage in a land war with France, Germany, Sweden, and Russia; would not have thought the proposer of such a question mad, and turned from him with the

the utmost disdain? Did not the one part of our administration profess themselves at the end of the last war, convinced of the folly of fighting other nations battles; and declare that for the future the powers of the continent must learn to take care of themselves? and did they not resolve never again to involve their country in any such foreign German quarrels? Did not the other part of our administrations at the beginning of this war, speak, write, protest, and even resign upon the same account? And yet all the extravagancies of past wars have been tripled in this, and that by the very party whose speeches are well remembered, and whose writings are still extant, foretelling all the evils, which we now suffer.*

Did we not in one place hear a famous speech end with a wish, that the word *Hanover* was expunged out of the *English Dictionary*? And have we not

* See a very excellent pamphlet call'd *Deliberate thoughts on the system of our late treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia*. Printed for J. Scott in Pater-noster-Row, 1756. Said to have been written by a gentleman who at that time came into place and went out again with the late minister.

I acknowledge him as an elder brother, and a much wiser, though I had not seen his work till some months after the publishing of the *Considerations*.

in another seen a great commoner draw forth even a gouty right hand from its sling in his bosom, and lay it upon the table, as the solemn pledge of his faith, that not a man should be sent to Hanover?

Little minds view every thing in the light of party; they read only to compliment their own sagacity in finding out whether the writer be for or against the side they espouse, and think no farther. Is then the honour of a great commoner, or the keeping three or four Peers in their places, a matter of higher importance, than the saving of our country? Do not both parties know, and secretly confess, that the nation was in the late reign sacrificing the blood of its subjects and exhausting its treasures even to the brink of ruin in a quarrel, which did not belong to it: and to gratify the avarice of German Princes, every one of which have even in this present war been offering themselves to France?

Did not the Duke of Brunswick declare that he had negotiated at Versailles and at Vienna, and had agreed to lend the French his troops? * Did not the late Landgrave at the same time signify to that court, *that he desired nothing more ardently than to attach himself wholly to France; and to make a treaty for that purpose.* Offering to that crown, his troops and his vote at the general and particular Dyets,

* See his expostulatory letter to Prince Ferdinand for carrying off his son from Hamburgh against his father's consent.

to put an end to the troubles of the Empire. Has not this court of Hesse been ever since threatening to leave us, as often as they wanted an increase of their subsidy? What else is the meaning of the spring treaties of the year 1759, 1760, and 1761? Or what less than this is implied in the reason which has been assigned for making them: That there was danger of the great enterprizes then in hand miscarrying, if the Landgrave's demands had not been complied with? Have we not for three springs following, since our German general took the command, seen enterprizes formed by him, every one of which have miscarried: the first it was said by his own delay, the next by that of a Hanoverian general, and the last by the treachery of another ally, who never yet kept his faith with us: and every one of which, if they had succeeded, could not have brought the least benefit to this country; but each of them had a direct tendency to amuse the parliament then sitting, to exhaust the treasury by a drain of two or three hundred thousand pounds a month, and to give the German courts an opportunity to take advantage of our necessities, and raise their demands upon us.

Have not both parties, during the late reign, shewn but too great a compliance in bringing the nation into this state of dependence? And when the public funds have been sinking under the pressure of more than a hundred millions of debt, have not each

shewn themselves but too ready to heap on more to the load, if they could but lay the blame of it upon the other?

To talk of oeconomy, whilst we persist in the same ruinous course, is only throwing dust into the people's eyes. By attempting things impracticable, we have been subjecting ourselves to the power of foreigners, whose sole end is to plunder, and make the most of us, and we would then quarrel with others for suffering them. We give away the public treasure by millions in one place, and then send our seconds down to another, to make a merit of oeconomy about hundreds.

We have multiplied Commissaries without end and without use. At first the pay of one was thought too much. We then sent eight, then six more, and then three more Commissaries of controul upon them. What has all this done, but only multiplied the expence? I mean not here to lay blame upon any one, but rather to commend. The combined force of both parts of the administration was exerted this summer, to put a stop to the exorbitant abuses in the expence of forage and extraordinaries. Able men were sought out for the employment of Commissaries of Controul. Very sensible and discerning men refused the offer; I doubt not but that the gentlemen who have accepted it, have done their utmost in the public service. What

has

has been the fruit of their labours ? The German army this year has been less numerous, and more expensive than the foregoing. What can be done in a ruined country, where all hate us, and all, from the head to the lowest, are in a combination to impose upon us ? What can be hoped for in a service, in which no one Prince upon earth has any common cause with us ; where our allies, and even our Generals are all hired by their pensions, and have not the least concern for any one thing belonging to us but our money.

Men may seek to get a name by talking of œconomy in the public hearing ; but if they desire to do good, let them apply their cure to the part where the evil grows, and plead for œconomy in those courts, whose sole aim hitherto has been to improve every advantage over us, which our necessities furnished them with. But to talk in public of œconomy, after having privately laid us at the mercy of a German chancery, is insulting the nation in its distress, instead of relieving it. 'Tis the mode and the seat of the war (as was very justly observed) which must be changed, if we really mean to consult œconomy. 'Tis the bringing it from the land to the sea ; from Germany to the French West-Indies, which must shew a real public concern. But to plead for a German war, and then to talk of œconomy, is first creating an incurable evil, and then seeking a merit in calling out for a remedy.

I have

I have for the reader's satisfaction, extracted from the Votes the several grants for the hire and pay of our German army for the year 1760*. From it the expence of our Hessian troops appears to be so exorbitantly great, as would have been incredible if we did not see the account.

The grand objection against sending our national troops abroad in all former wars has been this, that we could hire a number of foreign troops for half the money which our own would cost us: But so much is the value of Englishmen now sunk, that we give for a Hessian soldier double the price of a British one. Nay, so extremely improvident have we been, that we pay a much larger sum for twenty-two thousand Hessians than the price of forty-three thousand Wolfenbutlers, Hanoverians and Brunswickers, or of an hundred thousand Russians †. Yet, at that very time, when in our treaties we were thus prodigal of the public treasure, the defenders of them were perpetually declaiming about oeconomy.

There are many among us, who are often talking of the expence of the militia. Why these country troops should not be as good, and deserve as much as any other, I confess I don't see. Those men at least ought to think well of them, who trust them with our chief defence at home, while they are sending our national troops to fight for a foreign interest

† See Page 28.

country

est in Germany. I have cast up the sums voted for the militia-service for the year 1760; and all put together amount to 472,833 l. 1 s. 4 d. The reader may see them in the margin*.

But how justly soever this objection of greater expence may lie against a militia, those gentlemen surely cannot be supposed to make it from any real concern for their country, who can quietly see and vote for the sending more than double that sum out of the kingdom to maintain little more than half the number of foreigners. Will any man hereafter talk of the expence of the militia, when we give more money for German Boors, than an equal number of militia would cost, if they had every man the pay of an ensign?—Will a British parliament rate the service of a German common soldier, equal to

* 1759, November 6th, For the militia in
South Britain and two Scotch bat-
talions for 122 days, from 25th
December, 1759, to 25th April,
1760 ————— 102006 4 8

1760, April 28th, For militia in England
and Scotland to 24th Oct. 1760 260104 16 8
For cloathing of Ditto for the year
1760 ————— 30,722 0 0

May 4th, For unembodied militia to the
25th March, 1761 ————— 80,000 0 0
472,833 1 4

* One quarter of this should be deducted.

to that of an English officer, merely because he is not fighting for England.

The reader will naturally suspect that the 60,000 l. for bringing the Landgrave home is charged twice: but I have charged it no oftener than it is voted. Nor does it appear that the public has credit given it, by the return of either of them. Nor could it be intended to be returned for that year. The sixty thousand for the year 1760, was voted in the beginning of the Sessions, December 18th, 1759, the separate article promising an indemnification, was not made till the next April, and the protocol, which determined the sum, which this reasonable succour should amount to, was not signed till the 3d of May, 1761.

What then is it which the nation gains by the clause in the protocol, (*including therein the extraordinary subsidy?*) I answer, words, and nothing else. The Landgrave had received his sixty thousand pounds for the year 1760; he hoped to make a new demand of a reasonable succour for the French ravages in the year 1761, and he is content to renounce the claim of sixty thousand pounds hereafter, in order to intitle himself to ask of us four times that sum.

Others perhaps may object to the making these Hessians debtor to one fourth of the charge of forage and extraordinaries; but their original number of twenty two thousand four hundred and four is a quarter

ter of the army; and the noble Lord, who by his office must have been the best acquainted with their several returns, informed his hearers that he believed that the Hessians were as compleat as the several other corps; 1,310,573 pounds therefore, divided by 16000, give an allowance of 81 l. 18 d. 3 d. a man. The odd money will make up for the greater pay of the officers, and leave eighty pounds a man for the common soldiers. So hardly has the nation been ground between our negotiators and our allies. But this is far from being the whole of their expence to us. I have inserted in the account an article of 336,479 l. 14 s. 1 d. for bread, forage, and firewood to the Hessians, but have not added it; because it does not properly belong to the account of the year 1760, but of two foregoing years: 'tis here inserted only to give the reader an idea of the arrears which the nation has to expect to be brought in at the end of the war. 'Tis said, that there are many such articles. One very extraordinary one, to the amount of some hundred thousand pounds, appears in the Hessian treaty for the year 1760, by which the public is bound to give the Landgrave a year's pay after the end of the war. I have read over ~~the~~ *d,* the far greater part of the subsidy treaties made since the Revolution, not one of which has any such article. The most which has ever been given at dismission has been a month's pay. But our great Minister, whose chief measure of greatness in his plans, seems

seems to have been the greatness of their expence, has given to the Landgrave no less than twelve months pay. Yet so implicitly was the last parliament guided, that the public seems never to have taken notice of it.

These troops are now said to be still more defective in their musters : But even on the former state of them, they are a less numerous corps, than the clergy of this kingdom. I have now before me an estimate of the present value of all the ecclesiastical livings in the island ; and after casting up the several incomes of our Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Archdeacons, Prebendaries, Rectors, and Vicars, the value of the whole (with that of the Kirk of Scotland thrown into it) amounts to a much less sum, than that which is now sent out of the kingdom to maintain an inferior number of Hessians. Can we think of a worthy clergyman, devoting his life to the duties of his cure, and maintaining his family for forty pound a year ; and then think of our spending twice that sum upon a common soldier ? Will the fathers of our church concur in voting the service of a Hessian Boor in Germany to be equal in value to the labours of two English Curates ?

~~And~~ If the whole number of his Majesty's subjects in Britain, Ireland, and the plantations be reckoned at eleven millions, ten millions at least of these consist of people, who have not forty pound a year to spend upon themselves. Yet so highly do we rate the service of our German mercenaries, as to set the meanest of them upon the rank of our lower gentry.

gentry. Wherein had the whole poor of Britain offended, or what had an English day-labourer done against the late parliament, that when he by the sweat of his brow can earn but a shilling a day, he should have even that small pittance taxed, to maintain a foreigner of his own rank at four shillings and six-pence a day?—Will the representatives of the Commons of England go on with so unequal a distribution of the public treasure?

In the last war, his Britannic Majesty purchased the preservation of the House of Austria, which was effected by the peace of Aix la Chapelle, with the blood of his subjects, and by means of the most important conquests of his Crown. — These are not my words, but his late Majesty's *. In the language of an admired politician, “ he lavished his treasure, and his troops, “ and sacrificed the interest of his kingdoms to “ reinstate that Princess in the possession of the “ inheritance of her fathers †.” — Does any one doubt, but that we shall equally condemn ourselves a year after the next peace, if we should make the like sacrifices to another German Prince; who probably never had it in his will; certainly never can have it in his power, to do to the Crown of Britain any the least service?

* See the Memorial of the Elector of Brunswick to the Diet of the Empire, in November, 1758.

† The King of Prussia's Exposition of the Motives.

Are we, then to break our faith with him? No. Let us faithfully perform every thing which our treaties oblige us to, and that we may do without being ruined for him. We have, 'tis true, by such a treaty as no age can produce an instance of, bound ourselves not to make a peace without him, upon the single condition that he will accept of our money: But there is no treaty subsisting between the two crowns, which obliges us to keep a single English brigade in Germany, nor to continue his subsidy beyond the present month. None, I mean, of those which have been laid before parliament. But it is upon the faith of these only, that all grants have been made of the publick treasure; and no minister, it is to be hoped, has ever been so great, as to avow the having first bound the nation by one treaty, and then deceived it by laying another before parliament.

I have cast up all the sums which were granted by parliament for the German service, from the year 1720 to 1740. I don't mean those which the minister of that time allowed to be for the service of the Electorate; for he would have been impeached, if he had avowed the sending any thing thither; but of all those grants, which his opposers objected against, as intended to serve an Hanoverian interest: I mean the grants for subsidies and foreign forces; and votes of confidence, to concert

mea-

A C C O U N T

O F

GRANTS for CURRIE
 BILLS and COLLECTION
 MONIES
 And of VOTES of CREDIT
 ISSUED TO CONCERN THE
 MONIES WITH FORTIFICATION
 POWERS.

1731	—	—	1731	12,000	0	0
1732	—	—	1732	12,500	0	0
1733	—	—	1733	250,000	0	0
1734	—	—	1734	60,000	0	0
1735	—	—	—	—	—	—
1736	—	—	—	—	—	—
1737	—	—	—	—	—	—
1738	—	—	—	—	—	—
1739	—	—	—	—	—	—
1740	—	—	—	—	—	—
1741	—	—	—	—	—	—
1742	—	—	—	—	—	—
1743	—	—	—	—	—	—
1744	—	—	—	—	—	—
1745	—	—	—	—	—	—
1746	—	—	—	—	—	—
1747	—	—	—	—	—	—
1748	—	—	—	—	—	—
1749	—	—	—	—	—	—
1750	—	—	—	—	—	—
			Total			
			1,120,000			

A C C O U N T

O F

GRANTS for SUBSIDIES and FOREIGN FORCES; And of VOTES of Confidence to concert Measures with FOREIGN POWERS.

1721	-	-	-	-	1721	72,000	0	0
1726	75,000	0	0	-	1726	125,000	0	0
1727	270,000	0	0	-	1727	250,000	0	0
1728	305,923	11	8	-	1728	60,000	0	0
1729	316,259	1	3	-				
1730	266,259	1	3	-				
1731	247,509	1	3	-				
1732	22,694	7	6	-				
1734	39,937	10	0	-	1734	31,237	10	0
1735	56,250	0	0	-	1735	10,393	5	11
1736	56,250	0	0	-				
1737	42,187	10	0	-				
1739	70,583	6	8	-	1739	476,340	17	0
	L. 1,768,853	9	7			1,024,971	12	11
						1,768,853	9	7
					Total	L. 2,793,825	2	6

[To face Page 45.]

measures with foreign powers: all these added together amount in the course of twenty years to 2,793,825 l. 2 s. 6 d. These were the mighty sums, which ^{brought} out such torrents of eloquence; and employed the whole force and vigour of that numerous patriotic band, who have ennobled themselves by their opposition. I have not a word to offer in defence of giving a single shilling for German purposes. But might lie our censures upon his ashes, who, by such smaller sacrifices of about a hundred thousand pound a year, could sooth the natural prejudices of our German Kings for their native country, and keep the kingdom in peace. Well have these patriots lived to embalm his memory, who can now readily concur, and vote at least, if not write, for our spending upon a German service twice the sum in one year, which he spent in the whole course of twenty. The thoughtless multitude have a ready reply to make to this: *That was a time of peace; this is a time of war.* But they themselves are too wary disputants, to assign that as an excuse, which makes the principal aggravation of our misfortune. They will not say, that our being engaged in a war of our own, which costs us six millions a year, can be a reason why we should run into another war, which is not our own; or can the better enable us to spend six, seven, and eight millions more upon a German one.

brought out

I mean

I mean not to offend, and therefore doubt not the being forgiven: But in the debates of the year 1732, upon the dangers of a standing army (which then consisted of but seventeen thousand men, whereas our present English army amounts to one hundred and seventeen thousand men,) I meet with the following passage, which I shall be excused the quoting, as I intend it only to point out the extreme lengths which we are going: Mr. P——y very truly added, “ That the reason why a British army “ costs the publick more than a foreign one, was “ the greater proportion of officers. *And that sixty “ thousand men might be maintained in Germany for “ the same money that maintained eighteen thou- “ sand in Great Britain:* and that he had been in- “ formed that the twelve thousand Hessians in the “ government’s pay were maintained for much less “ than they cost the nation yearly.”* How would the great men then on the stage have looked upon each other, could it then have been known that we should live to see the time, when the *converse* of this proposition would become true; and that we should actually vote as much money to maintain eighteen thousand Hessians in Germany, as sixty thousand Englishmen cost us in Great Britain: yet this is the state of our present British and Hessian establishment. †

* Rapin’s Contin.

	l.	s.	d.
† 1759, Nov. 27. For 57,294			
English troops - - - -	1,383,748	0	0
16,000 Hessians cost (page 28) -	1,310,573	0	0
beside the one year’s pay.			

What

What did we not hear from the next sett of patriots, of Hanover councils, a Hanover steerage, and a Hanover rudder. Yet we have now literally freighted a vessel with British gold, and sent ship, freight, rudder and all to Hanover. The sound of millions is grown familiar to us, and they who regard not accounts, may perhaps weigh our expences in the lump. I speak not upon guess, but on strict arithmetic. The best built ship of five hundred tons will not carry the weight of pure gold, which this whole war has cost us. Happily for us the national vessel, beyond all expectation, has proved to be of a greater burden : but with so rich a cargo on float, who does not tremble for the voyage ? Or who of us for the sake of any personal or family interest, can think so desperately, as to go on to try how many more tons are wanting to sink it ?

That whole system of Europe, by which all the other states of it were united in guarding against the powers of France; those grand alliances by which Britain gained so many *real* victories on the continent, and to which, as I shall presently observe, it once entirely owed its security, are now no longer to be hoped for. I have in the Considerations hitherto reasoned upon the supposition of there being still subsisting such a thing as a balance of power in Europe, and a common interest to preserve it : because every argument for our concerning ourselves with the wars of the continent must imply this.

So

So long as this concern for the balance of power in Europe was subsisting in the minds of the chief states of it, it was certainly the interest of Britain to keep up that additional foreign guard against our most dangerous rival; but now the several powers of the continent, and all the German courts are so totally disjointed, and we have been so long making ourselves parties in their separate quarrels, that there is not the least hope of seeing any general union of Europe against the French: nay, we have been so long affecting to shew our riches and influence, and have by turns made every power in Europe so much our enemies, that they seem to be as jealous of us, as of France; and instead of our holding the balance of power between them and France, they are now watching for it between France and us. Tho' therefore that old principle that Britain had nothing to do with the continent, was certainly wrong, while the states of it were really united with us and with each other; yet now that all the powers of the continent have renounced us, it is as certainly right. We can have nothing to do with them, for they will have no concern with us, except only to take our money, to do their own business with it. Now therefore Britain must itself provide for its own security. Its safety against France depends, under providence, singly upon its own arm.

By the distractions, which the French encouraged the King of Prussia to raise in the Empire du-

ring the last war ; by our forcing the Empress Queen into the arms of France in this : and by deriving the French forces into Flanders, in the last, and thereby stripping our natural allies of their best guard there : the whole system of Europe is now changed. The barrier itself, as well as the barrier treaty is now no more ; Holland is become so exposed to France, that the Dutch dare not assist us, if they were ever so well affected to us. Britain's whole security therefore against an invasion now rests upon the one single defence of her fleets. The maintaining of that superiority, and preventing the French marine from ever rising again to an equality with ours, is now therefore become a matter of double the importance which it ever was of before : It concerns our very being. We have 'tis true at present ruin'd it : tho' with such an immense increase of debt, and such a mortgage upon our industry, as must be a heavy burden on our trade after the peace, and long disable us for any future war. Alarming considerations to every thoughtful man ! However, the enemies navy is now happily broken. But can any man say, if we should be forced to give up our conquests, and leave their fishery and sugar Trade intire, to what height an able ministry, and a ten years peace, may raise it. Men may be as sanguine as they please, and think, after we have beaten our enemies once, that we must always do so. It may be of use to abate our confidence, to recollect that in Charles the 11d's time,

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the French had only one ship in our seas to join to the Dutch fleet : that was the whole naval force which they then had in Brest. They afterwards brought round from the Mediterranean fifteen small ships under the Duke of Beaufort, which did nothing. Yet soon after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle Lewis the XIVth raised a fleet of sixty line of battle ships ; and in the year 1690, the French marine was grown to such a heighth, as to beat the united fleets of England and Holland off Beachy-Head ; and for a great part of the summer their fleet remained sole masters of the channel, and actually lay hovering over us, with all our coast exposed to them. Then Britain owed its security only to its alliances on the continent. The French troops were engaged on their distant frontiers against the united force of Germany, Spain, and Savoy, (who made this diversion at their own expence and not at ours :) and the battle of Flerus had so broken their army in Flanders, that they could not draw off their troops and form an army to invade us. But this is a means of deliverance which we must never hope for again : Surely therefore it imports us now to look to our own security, rather than that of distant countries which we have no concern with. The two nations are now brought to such a state, that a great superiority in our naval force is necessary to our very being: Providence has put it in our power for ever to secure that superiority, and nothing but the most fatal attachment to Germany can prevent it.

By

By the treaty of Closter-Seven the first German war was brought to an end. England was absolutely released from all concern with it by the express act of all the several parties. Now therefore we are engaged in two wars, which are totally distinct from each other: a British war, and a German: a war of necessity, and a war of choice: a war of acquisition, and a war of expence. The very laudable prejudices of the late reign, the interested views of courtiers, and the overbearing influence of particular planters, have jointly conspired to make us confound these two wars with each other: and the want of distinguishing them has betrayed us into an expence of forty millions, to ruin Germany, and to serve no one good British purpose, nor indeed to serve the interest of any one court in Germany, except that of Berlin. Now that the French marine is destroyed, there is not any the least connection between our British war and our German one. They are as separable from each other as any two wars which England can be engaged in. As distinct as a Spanish war and a Swedish. Make but this distinction, and the national interest will immediately point out what ought to be done. Party men on each side choose to confound these two together, each that they may find a pretence to condemn the conduct of their adversaries, and to justify their own.

We must have a peace, says the one party among us; the expence of the war will ruin us. We

have money enough, says another party; people are as ready to lend, as the government is to borrow; don't let us make an ignominious peace. Both of these speak truth of one war, and falsely of the other. Neither regard their country only, or they would make the necessary distinction. Do they, who say we must have a peace, really wish to save the nation from the ruinous expence it is now at? Why then do they not do it? Instead of looking to our enemies for a peace, let us make it for ourselves. *Quid opus est votis? fac te ipse felicem.* Instead of wishing for a peace, let us call home our troops, and there is a peace. Let us only stop the voluntary free gifts which we are every year making to our allies, over and above what they can pretend the least right of treaty to, and from that moment the German war ceases, and there is a peace. The war of acquisition, if our enemies will not treat with us, may go on, if we choose it; but the war of expence will be at an end. British blood will be no longer shed, and British treasure will then be spent only upon British subjects. Not thrown away in Germany merely to prevent our conquering too fast, and to keep us bleeding there, till our spirits are lower'd enough, to make us accept of any peace which our enemies will grant us.

On the other hand, do those men, who clamour against making a bad peace, really mean that we should make a good one? Why then do they not
address

address to put an end to the war of expence, which they know must at last force us into a bad one? Or why do they not pursue our war of acquisition only, which every one sees must be the direct means of forcing our enemies to grant us a good one?

In short, if Britain be a free and independent sovereignty, Providence has now put it in our power to support our own war as long as we please; and bring our enemies to what terms we please, which I hope will always be moderate ones. If, on the other hand, this country is made only for the defence of another, which it cannot protect, we must then struggle on a little longer, till our money or our patience shall be more entirely exhausted; but the terms of peace will be of the French prescribing, and not ours; and our enemies will, after that, ever hold us in thralldom, with the fear of evils, which they know we must not suffer, and cannot prevent.

To tell us that this is to be the last year of the war, and attempt to comfort us with the notion that our enemies are bankrupt, and come to ruin, is only taking advantage of our ignorance, and deceiving us to our own.

For three winters following, we have been told the same thing. *France*, it was said, the next sessions after the battle of Minden, *is sinking, she knows*

itself

knows herself sinking; this is the last effort of a dying power, the convulsion of death. Yet we have found her every summer in Germany to be in stronger vigour than ourselves. Perhaps it may be said, that the next campaign will certainly be the last. And, if so; it may be worth all the rest: and it is pity to lose a sheep for a penny-worth of tar. Eloquence indeed will not express ~~in~~ in such uncourtly terms: but suppose that, *hereafter*, instead of homely proverb, we should hear the same sentiment dressed out in bold poetical phrases, beautiful allusions, full flowering metaphors, and metonymies budding out of *them*: would that make the sentiment at all the more true? All these flowers of rhetoric may form a very elegant nosegay for English ladies to smell to:—but Frenchmen won't die of them. Nor would the war be at all the nearer being brought to a happy issue, for our statesmen amusing themselves with the bundling of tropes and similes.

In vain, alas, do we hope to humble our enemies in Germany, a country in which they have nothing to lose, and which we are utterly unable to defend. Five times have we essayed to roll this mighty stone up the hill, in order to turn it over the summit, upon the heads of our enemies on the other side: and, could we have fifty times tried it, we should still have found the attempt to be beyond
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our strength, and seen it come rolling back again on our own. With evil omen, therefore, shall the classics be called in aid to our politics. Virgil and Horace, however often turned to, will not befriend us. Old Homer, and all his mythology turns against us. The Fates have decreed this Syfippean labour to be in vain; and Virtue itself, however urging, cannot prevail against the Fates. Long before the pinch of the hill, the stone has always fallen back again; yet our inexorable task-master, with more than Rhadamanthean severity, is still ready, even singly, to condemn us to exert the force of all our millions to heave it up again.

It is curious to observe how hot and cold may be blown by the same breath. Can any man seriously think, that we are in the last moments at the end of a French war, and the next in the eve of a Spanish. If the Spaniards are dispos'd to begin with us; must they not be well assured that the French are not going to end with us?— Yet,

The nation is now threatened with a Spanish war. God forbid that we should court it; but if we are at liberty to pursue only the British interest, we can have no reason to fear it. Were the French marine in its
full

full vigour, such as it was in the beginning of the last war, and of this, and such as it will be against the next war, if we now neglect the proper means to secure ourselves; the addition of the Spanish marine to it, would in that case be a just ground of concern: but can those men really fear a Spanish war; in which, now that the marine of Spain must be unsupported by that of France, we can have nothing to fear, and must have every thing to hope for; and yet wantonly run the nation into an expence of ten millions for a German quarrel, in which we have not the least concern, and from which not the least good can result to Britain? Can men be really afraid of meeting a weaker power than ourselves at sea; and yet go to Germany to seek out a power at land, which is in itself stronger than we, and is supported by all the other powers of Europe beside?

On the other hand, can any man, who thinks a Spanish war unavoidable, still advise the charging ourselves with new expences, even in those parts of a German war which are avoidable, and which indisputably we may with good faith refuse.

But say others: Though it may have been wrong at first to have entered into such engagements, yet it is one thing to begin, and another to go on. Not, unless

unless the nation be bound by any treaty to continue in that wrong course; otherwise that which was wrong done the first time, cannot become right by being done a second time. So far as the public stands bound by any express covenant, so far (if it be not ruinous; or beyond our strength) we must go on: but in every other case, it has always been thought a mark of wisdom to recover a false step, rather than to repeat it. Apply this to a present instance, which must probably come this year before Parliament. By the separate article of the treaty with the Landgrave, of the 1st April, 1760, as the account is liquidated by the protocol of 1761, we have paid to the Landgrave an hundred and twenty thousand pounds down, and have engaged to pay him fifty thousand more for the two succeeding years. But should the Landgrave come another year with a second demand, and refuse to let his troops march without another two hundred and twenty thousand pound, does any treaty oblige us to do so wrong a thing a second time? The first treaty may have been made through inadvertence; but he who knows it to have been wrong, and yet makes a second, is self-condemned. Should the true reason be: such an one has bade two hundred and twenty thousand, therefore I must bid as much; that is the nation's misfortune. But no man's understanding will therefore say that wrong repeated becomes right. Two negatives here don't make an affirmative, *but vehementius negant*. If wrong done once, is wrong;
 I wrong

wrong done twice, is twice as wrong. No man can say, let me reap the benefit of doing wrong, and let others bear the blame of it, for having done so before. Nor can any one really think, that because we have once given to a German Prince more than he deserved, we are therefore bound to repeat it, and give him more and more of the public money, as often as he is pleased to want it. Not to add that it is ridiculous to talk of the faith of treaties, with a Prince, whose troops are eight or nine thousand men deficient.

But we are now got into the war, and how can we get out? They who ask this question would have us think that they reckon it a bad thing, and that they really wish to get out of it. If so, the answer is easy. By not getting farther into it. There is no need of violating any treaty; let us faithfully adhere to all our engagements; but let us not make fresh ones, and that alone will finish the war. Last year it was said, that the best thing in the Prussian treaty was its being but for a year. Why then should we renew it again? Whatever may be said about our making peace, this nation cannot be bound to give the King of Prussia four millions of crowns, as long as he shall be pleased to make war.

The annual treaty of 1758 expires in the present month, and cannot be renewed without the consent of parliament. Let any man read it, and then say, whether it be such an one; as that it can be suitable to

to the dignity of the British crown to renew it. I have printed the whole of it at the end of the Considerations. The preamble pretends to say nothing more, than that we want to give him money, and we want a treaty merely to make him take it. If the second article does not give us a right to demand for the defence of the Electorate the troops raised with our money, 'tis the most humiliating treaty to be found in the British annals. If we must deliver up our money, could we not have given it him without a treaty? and such a treaty too as is even more mortifying in the terms of it than in the expence of it: 'tis a treaty which obliges him to nothing. In the modern stile, it has no reciprocity in it. We put it in his power to keep us at war for ever; and debar ourselves the liberty without his consent of making peace with France, which he is not at war with, and therefore may be at peace with when he pleases. The only thing he promises is to pursue his own quarrel, and not to make peace with the houses of Mecklenburgh, Saxony and Austria, which, of all others, it is most for the interest of England that he should not be at war with.

Men who have great interests to serve, may offer many reasons for this German war; but the true reason is but one: and that too would cease, and become none, by a general concurrence; but while our great men are full of mutual jealousy, and every one suspicious, that what he might say in one

place, will be made use of to his disadvantage in another, this reason will still subsist:

Is then nothing worth the hazarding for our country? Must we only bewail the misfortune of our party disputes, and again see a proof, that those seasons, when the public thinks most about great men, are the very times, when great men think least about the public. This reason in the present times can be at first created only by the false court which supposed it, and must be strengthened and confirmed only by the same means. That may prompt men to invent a variety of plausible excuses for continuing the German war, and putting off the evil day a year longer, but all these ostensible reasons will prove vain before the face of truth, which every private man's understanding will dictate to him. Authority alone will not govern the thoughts: all men will not shut their eyes, because one man says he will guide.

Sometimes the aid of commerce is called in: and we are afraid that our enemies will be all powerful upon the continent, and we shall lose our trade. Not as long as we can make our goods and keep our commodities. Even our enemies will buy them of us, as long as we can sell cheapest: and our friends won't take them, when they become dearest. The French and Flemings at this time annually buy near three hundred thousand pounds worth of our tobacco; and Dunkirk, Havre, and Cette are now by that means our most profitable ports. Will Ham-
burghers,

burghers, think we, refuse to take Guadalupe or Martinico sugars of us, because both those islands are not in French possession?

Sometimes we have been told that our religion was in danger : and we hired Brandenburghers to murder and ruin Mecklenburghers in order to strengthen the Protestant interest.

At other times the German war is necessary as a diversion ; and we have for four years been spending twenty millions to prevent the French from succouring their colonies ; when half the troops and treasure employed in this diversion, would two or three years ago have given such an irresistible superiority to our fleets and expeditions, as would have left our enemies no colonies to succour.

Sometimes it has been doubted whether we can get our troops home if we would : if so, then it is at least a clear thing that we ought not to send any more. If our own General could in the midst of a campaign and even in the face of a victorious enemy, make good his retreat to Stadt, it will be very hard if our foreign general can't effect such a march when the French are gone into winter quarters.

At other times our compassion is applied to : we can't leave these poor people to be eat up by the French ; to have their country turned into a desert ;
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their very apparel sold at auction for their contribution *; their houses plundered, or pulled down for the soldiers firewood, and the helpless inhabitants exposed to starve without covering or shelter. Why then don't we protect them? We can't do it. Send over our whole army and the militia after them, the enemy will still be superior. The French may go home in winter, and let us spend our money there, that the country at their return may be the better worth squeezing, and our Gazette may tell us how Prince Ferdinand has drove them before him: but the next Summer the French army will be there again; and all that we can do is to enrage these poor peoples enemies ten times the more, and furnish them with an excuse for all their excesses. Let generous British hearts more *justly* express concern for them. But what is it which this argument would suggest in their behalf? Far from offering any relief, it would have us bribe the Landgrave by a great sum to sell his subjects afresh to ruin, and let the French come next year and commit the same cruelties over again.

In breaking the treaty of Closter Seven, Britain took a false step, which nothing can recover, but the bringing us to it again. France has no quarrel with any of our allies; they may all make their terms with France just as they did before: Brunswick, Hesse, and the Hanoverian chancery itself,

* See the last Gazette of November 1761.

under

under the mediation of Vienna, were then treating at Versailles. France has now no quarrel with any of them, nor can regard them as enemies any longer than while they can hope to see us ruin ourselves by regarding them as friends.

At other times we have been told that Holland and the Netherlands would be in danger. This was the pretext in the last war, and for the sake of a fatal diversion, we sent over our national troops into Flanders, against the will of the Dutch, to keep the war out of the Electorate, and ruin the barrier; and put our most natural allies into the power of France.

We may now be told, that Germany is in danger, and the French King will make himself Elector of Hanover, or Lord of Bremen, and gain a port upon the Weser and the northern ocean. And is not this a reason against our giving six hundred and seventy thousand pound to keep the houses of Austria and Brandenburg in blood, who would be the first to take umbrage at such an attempt? and who, with Sweden and Denmark, would be the nearest concerned, and the only powers able to prevent it?

In short, it is impossible to say what may be the ostensible reasons, which interested or indolent men may alledge, to conceal the true one. But all this is only giving to every man of common under-

standing an advantage, which no superiority of rank or parts can compensate for. I have before shewn, that the war itself, in its first principle, is wrong; against the true interest of Europe, of Germany, and of Britain, and therefore, in the nature of things, there can no argument be brought for it, which will not be convertible into a much stronger against it.

F I N I S.

